by the mere existence of regulation, thereby negating any ignorance defense. 5 What is the ultimate goal of criminalizing this behavior? Deterrence. 6 Conversely, China's environmental control policy has few criminal sanctions for executives and managers who pollute and very little enforcement of the laws that do have sanctions. 7 With its new leadership, China is poised to become an economic superpower.' However, as China continues to move toward a market-based economy, 9 it must balance the incredible tension between its economic potential and the stress that economic growth places on its natural environment. 0 There is no quick cure to problems caused by the competition between a nation's interest in economic growth and its fundamental need for a sustaining natural environment. Furthermore, this Note does not propose that the United States' method is ideal. It is far from it. Rather, this Note is an exploration of one possible addition that Chinese law may make as it continues the transition from a state-run economy to a market-based economy.
With this in mind, this Note will examine the United States' treatment of corporate pollution through the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine." Section two focuses on the United States use of criminal sanctions as a policy enforcement mechanism, with particular emphasis placed on regulation of hazardous waste. Section three looks at China's environmental situation with particular focus on China's "crimes against the environment" doctrine.' 2 Section four looks toward the potential for China to include vicarious corporate liability for environmental crime similar to the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Finally, section five provides observations on general corporate governance and impacts on the environment. 806-07 (1996) . Under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, a corporate officer may be held criminally liable if by virtue of his or her position and authority within the company, the officer had the power to prevent or correct the conduct that gave rise to the violation. See id. This liability may attach even though the officer did not personally participate in the commission of the offense. See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2000
12. See Yang, supra note 7, at 146.
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THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
Enforcement of criminal liability for environmental crimes in the United States is on the rise. 3 "Clean up your act or go to jail" is a message increasingly sent to corporate executives and managers. 4 Increased political pressure and public awareness has resulted in more vigorous prosecution. 5 In a single year, seventy-eight percent of the environmental prosecutions handled by the United States Department of Justice involved corporations and their managers.' 6 More significantly, the Department of Justice has been achieving a ninety-five percent conviction rate for all environmental prosecutions. 7 The total number of years assessed for criminal sentences rose from 146 in 2001, to 256 in 2002.18 At the close of the year 2000, the total of all criminal fines assessed under all environmental criminal enforcement programs totaled nearly 720 million dollars.
The application of criminal liability for environmental crime to corporate executives is known as the responsible corporate officer doctrine. 9 Under this theory of liability a corporate officer is liable for the acts of his or her employees. 20 Juries are allowed to infer culpability based on the officer's position, responsibility, and authority in a company. (1994) . Vicarious criminal liability for corporate oversight of environmental violations conflicts with the cultural principles of responsibility and substantive due process as found in the Japanese Constitution. See id. It is not just a foreign concept to Japanese environmental law; it is foreign to all Japanese law. See id. However, the general principles of Japanese criminal law still apply and crimes against the environment are treated no differently than any other health or property violations. See id. Therefore, imputability to a corporate executive or plant manager must be direct and found in the factual evidence rather than implied through the legal construct of vicarious liability. See id. Therefore, an executive or manager who directly orders a subordinate to violate Japanese environmental law would be criminally liable for aiding and abetting the act. See id. However, there is a possibility that an executive actions or general corporate officer doctrine imposes what has been colloquially called a "should have known" standard of responsibility on corporate officers for activities or violations that they supervise. 22 Not only are corporate officers expected to monitor and exercise control, they are also expected to do so in an effective manner. 23 Courts' acceptance of the "should have known" mens rea 2 4 makes obtaining convictions against corporate officers less difficult than crimes requiring specific knowledge. Early sentences for environmental convictions commonly involved suspended sentences, probation, and community service. 26 However, prosecutorial zeal, combined with strict adherence to the federal sentencing guidelines, has led to higher fines and incarceration. 27 Hazardous waste protection in the United States is covered primarily under two statutes: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 28 pattern of leadership, or lack thereof, could be constituted as inciting criminal behavior. See Itoh, at 1045. For a general review of Japan's environmental policy, including a specific discussion on the Japanese preference for proactive regulatory solutions and general reluctance to use criminal law, though it is in force, as a post hoc regulation, see JULIAN GRESSLER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN (1981 
A. The Resource Conservation And Recovery Act
RCRA, enacted in 1976, authorizes the federal government to regulate the generation, storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes. 32 The primary purpose of RCRA is to reduce creation of hazardous waste, manage its safe transport, and eliminate its dangerous disposal. 33 RCRA establishes standards governing generators and transporters of hazardous waste, as well as, owners of treatment and disposal facilities that may require a permit from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 34 RCRA requires development of state or regional solid waste plans. 5 RCRA also addresses the obligations of hazardous waste generators and transporters through detailed permitting and notification requirements, 36 violations of which may result in criminal sanctions.
37
RCRA is divided into nine subtitles with the hazardous waste provisions being located in Subtitle C. 38 
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litigated the difference between abandoned waste and materials set for reuse within the production process." RCRA categorizes hazardous wastes as two types: "listed" and "characteristic. 4 2 "Listed" wastes are those wastes enumerated by the EPA as known hazardous wastes. 43 "Characteristic" wastes are those solid wastes that contain enough hazardous substances to exhibit characteristics of a hazardous waste."
The most common criteria for establishing a "characteristic" waste are ignitability, reactivity, corrosiveness, and toxicity. 45 RCRA is unique in that it establishes the use of manifests. 46 A manifest is a traveling document prepared by the generator 47 for waste leaving their site. 48 The purpose of the manifest is to track waste through generation, transportation, storage, and eventual disposal. 49 The manifest travels with the substance from generation, at the cradle, through its useful life, until its eventual disposal, at the grave. This is why the RCRA scheme of waste tracking is commonly referred to as "cradle-to-grave tracking" of the waste. 50
Criminal Liability Under RCRA
The criminal prohibitions under RCRA apply to the entire "cradle-tograve" process. It is illegal to transport waste to an unregulated facility. 5 " Treatment, storage, or disposal of wastes without a permit is also illegal. 52 RCRA prohibits omissions or making false statements on any report, manifest, [Vol. 13:2 PurrING TIlE Boss BEHIND BARS or other required document.
53 RCRA authorizes the EPA to inspect facilities upon the exparte issuance of an administrative search warrant. " The second provides for penalties for knowing endangerment. 56 The "knowingly" requirement is a major point of contention in applying RCRA's criminal standard. In United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 57 the defendants were convicted of transporting hazardous waste to a facility without a permit. 58 The prosecution was required to prove that the defendants knew the landfill to which the waste was being transported did not have a permit. 5 9 However, the Alabama district court found that the prosecution could demonstrate scienter° with circumstantial evidence from which the jury could draw inferences. 61 In its opinion, the court stated "knowledge does not require certainty, and the jurors may draw inferences from all of the circumstances, including the existence of the regulatory scheme." 
Scienter is used:
to signify an allegation... setting out the defendant's previous knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of, or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard against, and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of. The term is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge. BLACK'S, supra note 24, at 1345.
61. See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504. The government may establish "knowledge" by (1) showing that the defendant was aware that a result was practically certain to follow from particular conduct; (2) showing that the defendant willfully failed to determine the permit status of the landfill it selected; (3) raising inferences from the context of the transportation of the defendant's waste; or (4) presenting evidence of failure to follow regular waste disposal procedure. See id.
62. Id. at 1505. See generally Karen M. Hansen, Knowing Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 987 (1990) ("knowing" requirement for prosecution under RCRA and other environmental protection laws is too difficult to prove, and therefore, the responsible corporate officer doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine are being used by prosecutors to circumvent the knowledge requirement).
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Hayes' defense was ignorance of the waste disposal requirements imposed under RCRA. 63 The court rejected that defense, noting the heavily regulated nature of the waste disposal business and the inherent dangers it posed to the public. 64 The court established that "the jurors must find that the defendant knew what the waste was" and knew of the absence of a permit. 65 Other 
Disposal And Storage Under RCRA
For cases involving storage and disposal of hazardous waste without a permit, the government must prove that the material was "waste" 7 and that the defendant knew that the waste was at least generally harmful or dangerous. 72 The prosecution was not required to prove that the defendant knew that the 63 of Georgia at the time imposed the longest prison sentence ever for an environmental crime on two corporate officials of a waste disposal facility in Georgia. 75 The officials were convicted of storing, transporting, and disposing hazardous wastes without a permit and for making false statements. 76 The president of the company received a twenty thousand dollar fine and a three year prison term, while a vice-president was fined ten thousand dollars and sentenced to eighteen months in prison. 77 Similarly, in United States v. Vanderbilt Chemical Corp, 78 the vice-president/plant manager was given a three-year suspended sentence, three-years probation, a ten thousand dollar fine, and three hundred hours of community service for illegally disposing hazardous waste under RCRA.
79 Also, the company paid one million dollars in fines and restitution. 8°I 
2003]
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree, citing the generally hazardous nature of the substances the defendants were working with as sufficient notice to overcome an ignorance defense. 89 In assessing criminal liability for corporate executives, prosecutors often combine other charges with the RCRA violations. In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,90 a federal grand jury indicted a Rhode Island company and its president under RCRA violations, racketeering charges, and mail fraud. 9 ' The indictment, with fifty-three total counts, charged the company president and three employees with illegally transporting hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility and falsifying the waste manifest documentation. 92
Transportation Of Waste Under RCRA
In finding liability of a corporate officer for transporting hazardous waste under RCRA, the government must show similar "knowing" elements as in storage and disposal. In MacDonald, 93 the owners of a transportation company were found to have knowingly transported toluene-contaminated soil to a facility that was not permitted to accept that type of waste. 94 The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the trial court instruction that the officer knew the violation occurred. 95 The court held that the trial court's taking judicial notice of the defendant's knowledge was incorrect and the prosecution could prove knowledge by actual knowledge and citcumstantial evidence suggesting knowledge. 96 See id. However, there is no general immunity from criminal liability for actions taken while in public service. See Dee, 912 F.2d at 748-49.
89. See id. The Fourth Circuit pointed to the public welfare nature of RCRA by stating "where.. . obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of that regulation." Id. at 745. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that they were being prosecuted for "sloppy storage procedures." Id. at 747. The court did not agree and retorted by saying that is just such a behavior that is an "evil RCRA was designed to prevent." Id.
90 
Knowing Endangerment
Violators face stricter penalties for RCRA offenses if it can be proven that the violator knowingly placed others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. 97 For such "knowing endangerment" offenses, violators may be fined up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars, 98 imprisoned for up to five years, or both. 99 Corporations may face additional fines up to one million dollars.'o Knowing endangerment has two elements: (1) the defendant must have committed an offense under RCRA, such as false reporting on a manifest or disposal at an unpermitted site, and (2) at the time of the offense, the defendant must have known that he was placing another person in imminent danger of death or serious injury.' 0 ' To prove the first element, the government need only show that the defendant was "aware of the nature of his conduct."' 1 2 In other words, "the government need only prove that the defendant was aware of the conduct, and that the conduct was illegal."'°3 To prove the second element, however, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the offense the defendant was "aware or believes that this offensive conduct is substantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury."'10 4 The prosecution must show that the offense was committed by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 5 A corporate officer who did not physically spill or bury hazardous waste may still be culpable for the violations caused by a subordinate. categories: (1) owners and operators of a facility involved in a CERCLA offense' 23 and; (2) prior owners or operators of a facility where hazardous waste is stored or disposed if he or she owned or operated the facility at the time the waste was received.' 24
Id. § 6928(0(4).

99.
Criminal Liability Under CERCLA
To establish criminal liability for failure to report a release of a hazardous substance, prosecutors must show: (1) that the substance was "hazardous,"' 125 (2) that it was a reportable quantity, 126 (3) that it was released into the environment,' 27 (4) that the release was not a federally permitted release, 28 (5) that the defendant was a person "in charge" of the facility, 29 . A "reportable quantity" is one pound of hazardous substance unless superseded by any regulation promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a). See id.; see Hansen, F.3d at 1253 (requiring government to show at least one pound of mercury released and at least ten pounds of chlorine were released into the environment during a twentyfour hour period to meet elements of separate CERCLA charges associated with both substances).
127. See Tosco Corp. v. Koch Industries, 216 F. 3d 886, 891-94 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding adequate evidence of "actual release was provided by the fact that defendant 'could not account for seven percent of its daily throughput, thus evidencing a large volume of material, including liquid phase petroleum hydrocarbons containing hazardous constituents, leaking from the process units into the environment"'). A "release" is to be distinguished from "disposal" according to CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (29) (2000). See Bob's Beverage v. Acme, Inc., 264 F.3d 692,697 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding disposal did not occurbecause contamination was caused by passive migration of hazardous materials present in environment before defendant took any action). But see Crofton Ventures, 258 F.3d at 297 (applying narrow interpretation of "disposal" to require proof that defendant actively dumped hazardous waste on their property fails to recognize CERCLA's strict liability scheme).
128. See United States v. Freter, 31 F.3d 783, 788 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing an exception for federally permitted release as affirmative defense so government need not prove release was not federally permitted).
129. See Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1253-54 (determining "in charge" as an individual that has or shares control of a facility where a release occurs); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding maintenance foreman criminally liable for acquiescence in illegal dumping); but see United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314-15(6th Cir. 1998) (holding operator or owner must have actual control and must have performed affirmative actions, although the owner-operator is also responsible for similarly negligent acts or omissions).
[Vol. 13:2 PUTING THE Boss BEHIND BARS (6) the defendant did not notify the EPA immediately upon learning of the release. 130 Though the "failure to notify" provision for the existence of an unpermitted facility has only received limited judicial interpretation, the statute131 suggests the government must also prove that the defendant owned or operated the facility at which the hazardous waste was stored, and that they knowingly failed to notify the EPA of the existence of the facility.' 32 Failure to notify an appropriate agency of a release of hazardous waste can result in a fine or imprisonment up to one year, or both.' 33 Failure to notify the EPA of an unpermitted disposal site can result in a fine up to $10,000, a year in prison, or both.' 34 The "knowing destruction" provision or falsification of records criminal provisions under CERCLA has undergone limited judicial interpretation. 3 The statute implies that prosecutors must show that the defendant was a person required under Section 9603 of the Act to provide notification,' 3 6 that the defendant knowingly destroyed files, 137 and that the EPA identified the destroyed files that were subject to the reporting requirements. 3 ' A person convicted of knowing destruction or falsification of documents can be fined, imprisoned for three years, or both. 130. See United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring that defendant need only be aware that his acts are harmful for criminal conviction under CERCLA. He does not have to know the specific requirements of CERCLA that have been broken). In Laughlin, the Eleventh Circuit only lists four elements for a criminal conviction: (1) the defendant was, in fact, in charge of the facility; (2) that a reportable quantity was released; (3) the defendant knew of such a release; (4) after learning of the release, the defendant failed to immediately notify the EPA. See Jalley, supra note 118, at 489. 
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Similarly, there has been limited judicial interpretation of CERCLA's criminal penalties for filing false claims for reimbursement. 4 The language of the statute again suggests that the government must prove that the defendant knowingly gave erroneous information in a claim for a Superfund reimbursement. '' There are criminal penalties for filing a false claim under Superfund. 42 However, these criminal penalties can be mitigated through voluntary cooperation with the EPA,' 43 so much so, that the EPA would decline to refer violations to the Department of Justice for prosecution.'" Voluntary measures such as general cooperation, preventative measures, self-policing and compliance programs, and voluntary disclosure of information can forestall prosecution by the EPA and Department of Justice.' 45 CERCLA, through Superfund, authorizes the EPA to pay a $10,000 reward to any citizen who provides information leading to the arrest and conviction of a CERCLA violator.' 46 Violations subject to this reward include failure to report a release of a hazardous substance and the destruction of records.' 47 Rewards are evaluated by the severity of the reported violation and the overall value of the report leading to arrest and conviction. 4 
'
Ill. THE CHINESE SYSTEM China faces serious environmental problems. They include: increases in smoke and dust emissions by seven percent per year;' 49 dependence on coal as a fossil fuel which increases the prevalence of acid rain deposition to the point of causing harm to agriculture and fishing; 5 0 production of 100 million tons of wastewater per day;' 5 ' industrial solid waste expected to reach a mark of 250 million tons 5 2 annually with two million tons categorized as hazardous waste;
153 and host to seven of the ten most polluted cities in the world. An overly simple, but possibly accurate, answer for the cause of these problems is that the combination of China's incredible population size, poverty level, per capita income, and the incredible growth of China's economy has led to a voracious need for resources.' 55 The problem is only exacerbated by the actions of more developed nations; particularly those that use China's lack of well developed environmental safeguards as an advantage.' 6 From the founding of the People's Republic of China until the mid-1970's, the government has focused the majority of its resources on modernization and economic growth.
57
Environmental protection was afforded only marginal consideration in national economic planning. 58 As a result, resources were only dedicated to environmental issues during emergency health situations. 59 waste has led to a disturbing problem. See id. Medical waste, such as gauze, has been used as batting to make quilts or as liners in cotton-padded jackets for sale to unsuspecting buyers. See id. 
See Cleaning Up Can
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Though China has recognized the need for a more comprehensive environmental policy, the programs implemented are in the formative stages.' 60 The first step in this reformulation was the public admission that environmental degradation was a direct outcome of market-driven planning. 6 ' Within that admission, the Communist party proposed adopting an environmental policy that would establish liability for environmental damage through causation."' With such awakenings comes change. China's goals for changes in environmental policy are:
(1) the clarification of institutional responsibilit[y] toward the environment; (2) the incorporation of internationally recognized principles [of environmental policy], including the polluter pays principle;' 63 (3) establishment of administrative controls, such as permitting, registration, and reporting requirements; and (4) the use of economic measures, such as fines and taxes, to induce acceptable behavior.'A With the rapid establishment of a market economy in China, a principle concern for policymakers is to encourage state-run companies to make independent decisions, rather than relying on their previous custom of receiving orders and instructions under a centralized government.' 65 However, in making such market reforms, the government has been less concerned with the extent of new government regulation and more concerned about whether the government should be involved at all. ' 66 It has been speculated that the Chinese government will not only take a reduced role in directly managing economic affairs, but will also remain aloof in environmental affairs as well. 167 The new fiduciary duties of managers toward their respective enterprises, combined with the diminished relationship between government and those enterprises, may have a negative effect on the impact of corporations on China's environment. 16 8 The current environmental regulatory framework includes few criminal enforcement mechanisms for environmental crimes. 1 69 Those regulations that do contain criminal provisions do not specify with great detail either the elements of the crime or the punishment to be imposed. 170 Rather, those regulations make a general reference to the Criminal Code.
7 ' However, China does recognize health and property violations under the concept of "crimes against the environment."' 72 As of yet, corporate liability has not explicitly emerged in China's environmental regulatory scheme.' 73
A. Crimes Against The Environment
Unlike the United States, China provides for environmental protection directly through its constitution.
China's constitution provides for environmental protection in two ways. First, the constitution provides for rational use of natural resources,1 74 and that the state will control pollution and the human environment.' Second, the constitution provides for indirect protection of the environment through such broad language as "socialist public property is sacred and inviolable."' 76 Since most property in China is stateowned public property, the constitution provides a large base for regulation of activities that could damage the environment. 1 77 The constitution also provides IV. ANALYSIS The responsible corporate officer doctrine is a concept of legal liability based on the construct of respondeat superior." 8 The greatest fault of the doctrine is that it imposes criminal liability on an individual who may not have taken a physical role in committing an environmental crime." 9 However, the liability is justified because had the corporate officer correctly done his job, the crime would not, or possibly could not, have been committed. The doctrine implies that the environmental harm would not have occurred but for management's complicity or ineptitude. Furthermore, knowledge of the crime is imputed based upon the greater public welfare purposes of environmental protection laws. 2 2° Specific knowledge need not be proven. Rather, under the doctrine, prosecutors need only show the dangerous nature of the acts. 22 z
The broad framework for establishing a form of the responsible corporate officer doctrine in China is in place. China's constitutional provisions regarding environmental quality and health are beyond any such provisions in the United States' Constitution. 2 3 China's Criminal Code provides for environmental crimes caused by "dereliction of duty." 22 4 Further, there is some evidence that in China's jurisprudence, criminal sanctions for factory leaders have been considered and imposed, if only rarely. 225 Yet with the legal framework in place to prosecute those leaders who allow environmental harm, prosecution and enforcement remains sparse. 226 This can be explained somewhat by the command economy system previously in place. 227 However, with China's transition to a market system, an enforcement mechanism geared toward corporate, rather than state, entities is justified.
Beyond more rigid adherence to the provisions currently in place, a practical improvement for the Chinese system is to include specific criminal sanctions in each environmental statute, as in RCRA 228 and CERCLA. 22 9 An explicit and clear statement in each statute, stating the duties of both workers and managers in preventing and reporting pollution, would avoid the confusion inherent in the current loose confederacy of constitutional provisions, statutes, and enforcement mores. Inherent in the enforcement of any crime is the ability to discover it, or catch someone in the act of committing it. America's success in regard to environmental enforcement is the ability to monitor the generation or movement of waste, or to have real time outputs on smokestacks and outflow pipes. 23° For China to effectively enforce its "crimes against the environment," it must first know they are happening. This will not happen until China forces its new corporations to monitor and report the pollution generated at their plants and factories.
For China to improve its protection of the natural environment, it must take aggressive and direct action while the conversion of state-owned industry to independent corporations is still in its formative stages. China's existing laws, particularly dereliction of duty, are sufficient to apply a form of the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Environmental statutes can be improved with clear and explicit statements of corporate culpability based on a should have known standard. Finally, greater effort should be made in the monitoring and enforcement of the environmental protection laws.
V. CONCLUSION
What is most shocking about using criminal sanctions against corporate leaders is that the sanctions are even needed at all. Judge Conte's quote opening this Note reflects his shock and frustration at having to sentence an executive for illegal dumping. 23 ' In that proceeding, he stated that "the crimes are particularly vexing because [the defendant] had the education and financial means to create a good life for himself and his family., 2 32 It can be implied that Judge Conte believes in a "should have known better" standard of liability rather than a "should have known" standard.
Executives and managers are not only leaders within their organizations, but also, they are often leaders in their communities. The best explanation for their actions is the desire to compete and succeed, with measurement based in terms of profit, speed, or productivity. However, in doing so, they were compelled to cheat by ignoring environmental protection law. 233 For a white
